Introduction
One of the key questions in the unemployment insurance (UI) literature is how the length of the benet period aects the duration of unemployment spells and the quality of subsequent job matches. A major challenge of causal inference is to nd exogenous variation in the length of the benet period. The most convincing studies have relied either on discontinuities in the benet rule that determines the length of the benet period as a function of age and/or work history (e.g. Card et al. 2007; Schmieder et al. 2012; Caliendo et al. 2013; Lalive 2007; Le Barbanchon 2016; Lalive 2008) or policy changes that extended or reduced the benet period for some group of the unemployed but did not aect other groups (e.g. Hunt 1995; van Ours and Vodopivec 2006; Lalive et al. 2006) . The regression discontinuity approach can be applied only in the case of certain countries where the length of the entitlement period varies across worker groups (e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy and Portugal).
1 A common problem with the policy reforms is that the benet periods are often extended in response to recessions (e.g. the federal-and state-level benet extension programs in the U.S.) or to the relatively poor employment development of a certain worker group, so that the policy changes themselves are endogenous (Card and Levine, 2000; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004) . Large-scale reforms may also have spillover eects on those who are not directly aected through search externalities (Levine 1993; Lalive et al. 2015) . In the case of Finland, neither of these approaches can be applied.
In Finland, the maximum duration of UI benets remained at 100 weeks for all unemployed for several decades up until 2013.
2 As there has been no variation in the maximum benet duration that one could have exploited for identication in the analysis, no empirical evidence on the eects of potential benet duration exists for Finland. This is particularly unfortunate at the times when the Finnish UI scheme is being reformed. The reforms implemented so far have involved quite substantial reductions in the length of the entitlement period. In 2014, the maximum benet duration was reduced by 20 weeks for those with less than three years of work experience. This was followed by a general 1 The regression discontinuity approach is not immune to confounding factors either. First, the running variable (e.g. work history) that determines eligibility for an extended benet period may be measured with error which can bias the results unless benet eligibility is directly observed in the data. Second, workers (and perhaps also their employers) have an incentive to manipulate the timing of unemployment entry in such a way that the benet claimant qualies for a longer benet period. Finally, behavior of the unemployed just below the eligibility threshold provides a poor counterfactual if they can establish eligibility for a longer benet period by taking up a very short job.
2 There is an exception for the oldest unemployed as those exceeding a given age threshold before their regular UI benet expire may qualify for extended benets until retirement. In practice, this scheme acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed workers, some of whom self-select themselves into the program. Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector workers at least doubles at the age threshold of this scheme, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that approximately one half of unemployed workers eligible for the benet extension withdraw from job search entirely.
reduction of 20 weeks that came into eect at the beginning of 2017. Together these two changes have shortened the maximum benet period by 20% for the majority of the people and by 40% for those with less than three years of work experience. Given the long entitlement periods in Finland and the fact that the new rules only aect new UI spells, it will take some time before we will have access to data with a suciently long follow-up period to evaluate the eects of these reforms. Meanwhile, we propose and apply a novel approach to estimate the causal eects of potential benet duration in the absence of variation in the maximum benet period.
In Finland, an unemployed worker who has worked for a certain minimum number of weeks during the past two years is awarded a new period of UI benets (500 payment days or 100 calendar weeks prior to 2014). A worker who enters unemployment without satisfying this employment condition may still be entitled to UI benets if he or she has unused UI days from a previous unemployment spell. Within this group the remaining benet entitlement can be anything between 0 and 499 days, being 0 for those who exhausted their UI benets in the past and for those who have not received UI benets before. Thus, even though the maximum entitlement period is the same for all unemployed, there is variation in potential benet duration at the beginning of unemployment spells among workers with somewhat sporadic employment histories. Obviously this variation alone does not permit causal inference because it is completely driven by dierences in labor market histories.
To identify the causal eects we take advantage of a change in the employment condition that reduced the minimum number of employment weeks required for renewal of the entitlement period in 2003. As a result of the reform, workers who satised the new but not the old employment condition became eligible for UI benets for dierent periods of time depending on the date of their unemployment entry, whereas other workers were not aected by the reform. Provided that the change in the employment condition did not affect the unemployment inow, the resulting variation in the length of benet entitlement within the aected group is exogenous and thus the causal eects of potential benet duration can be identied. Since the reform aected only a relatively small fraction of all UI recipients, we are not worried about the confounding spillover eects.
We use comprehensive data that combines information from various administrative registers. A particular feature of the data is that we can keep track of the number of remaining UI days over time. In particular, we observe the number of available benet days at the beginning of the current unemployment spell (i.e. potential benet duration) as well as the number of unused benet days at the end of the previous spell, if any (i.e. counterfactual benet duration if the employment condition is not satised). We classify workers who became unemployed between 2000 and 2004 into groups dened by the number of employment weeks and the number of unused UI days from the previous spell.
These groups were aected dierently by the 2003 change in the employment condition.
The groups where employment weeks exceed the new but not the old threshold of the employment condition are the most likely to experience a notable increase in potential benet duration after 2003. Moreover, within these groups, the average increase in potential benet duration is larger for those with fewer UI days from the previous spell.
Under the assumption that the expected value of unobserved characteristics in dierent groups follows the same trend, we can estimate the eects of potential benet duration by comparing changes in the unemployment outcomes over time across dierent groups.
Our ndings indicate that one additional week of UI benets increases the expected duration of compensated unemployment by some 0.15 weeks, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.5. This eect appears to be fairly homogeneous, as the absolute eect varies between 0.10 and 0.22 weeks across various subgroups of workers. The eect is quite similar for women and men, for dierent education groups, and for private-and publicsector employees, as well as for those facing dierent labor market conditions. However, workers aged 45 and over and those with relatively high UI benets may be somewhat more responsive to changes in the length of the benet period.
We nd evidence that longer benet periods improve the quality of the rst postunemployment job: one additional week of benets is estimated to increase the expected wage and duration of the next job by some 2 Euros a month and 0.15 weeks, respectively.
The former eect is very small, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.06, whereas the latter eect is economically signicant with an elasticity of 0.19. The eect on quality of next job varies across groups, being close to zero in many cases. Women, low educated and private-sector employees are the most likely to benet in terms of higher wages or more stable jobs from the longer job search periods that longer benet periods enable.
Our study makes three contributions. First, we provide rst evidence on the eect of potential benet duration on unemployment duration for Finland. Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014) summarize the ndings of the previous studies for other countries by concluding that a one week increase in the potential benet duration typically prolongs average unemployment duration by approximately 0.2 weeks. Although our approach diers from the previous studies that exploit exogenous variation in the maximum benet duration, our estimate of 0.15 is of the same magnitude. Second, our study contributes to the literature on the eect of potential benet duration on quality of subsequent job matches. This literature has produced mixed results, some studies nding small positive eects on subsequent wages or job stability while others report small negative eects or no eects at all. Our results for Finland are rather encouraging as we do nd evidence of some positive impacts on match quality.
Finally, we show that it may be possible to estimate the causal eects of potential benet duration even when there is no variation in the maximum benet duration. In most countries, benet eligibility depends on the record of past employment and awarded benets can be collected over several unemployment spells. In these cases, the approach proposed here can be applied provided that the eligibility rules have changed over time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the Finnish UI system during the period under investigation and describes the reform in 2003. This is followed by a section describing our data and sample restrictions. Section 4 presents descriptive evidence to support the validity of our research design and likely eects of potential benet duration. Section 5 describes the econometric model and reports the estimation results along with the results of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
Unemployment insurance in Finland
Earnings-related UI benets are paid by unemployment funds. Membership in these funds is voluntary, but as many as 90% of employed workers were members in 2015. A worker who lost his or her job qualies for 100 weeks of UI benets (500 weekdays) provided that he or she (i) has registered as an unemployed job seeker at the public employment service, (ii) has been a member of an unemployment fund for at least ten months (membership condition), and (iii) has worked for a minimum number of weeks in a certain time interval (employment condition). Workers who are 57 years or older on the day when their regular UI benets expire are entitled to extended benets until retirement.
The level of UI benets has no cap but the replacement rate declines rapidly with the level of past earnings. If the benet recipient leaves unemployment without exhausting his or her benets, and then returns to unemployment before satisfying the employment condition again, he or she will be entitled to unused UI benets from the previous spell (given that he or she did not leave the labor market for a period longer than six months without an acceptable reason). Those who exhaust their UI benets can claim a meanstested, at-rate labor market subsidy, which is paid by the Social Security Institution for an indenite period.
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Participants of labor market training programs receive a training subsidy, which equals the unemployment benet the worker would have otherwise received. Furthermore, an 3 Those unemployed who do not belong to an unemployment fund but satisfy the employment condition are eligible for a at-rate basic allowance which is the same amount as the labor market subsidy and which is paid for a period of 500 days without means testing. In practice, this benet type is of minor importance and their recipients are not covered in our analysis.
unemployed worker who takes up a part-time job or a very short full-time job may be entitled to a reduced amount of benets, i.e. partial benets. The entitlement period for a worker on partial UI benets elapses at a reduced rate proportional to the ratio of the partial benet to full-time benet. Thus, the unemployed can collect earnings-related benets longer than 100 weeks due to part-time unemployment and participation in the labor market training programs.
The 2003 change in the employment condition
Before 2003, the employment condition was met if the benet claimant had worked and made contributions to an unemployment fund for at least 43 weeks (contribution weeks) within the past 24 months (review period). During each contribution week the claimant had to have worked for 18 hours or more. For those unemployed who had renewed their UI entitlement last time within two years prior to the current spell, the review period was shorter and dened as the time between the end of the previous UI spell and the end of the job preceding the current spell. On the other hand, the length of the review period could also be extended if the claimant had been outside the labor force for some acceptable reason, such as illness, military service or taking care of a young child at the home.
In 2003, the minimum number of contribution weeks required for renewal of the 500-day entitlement period was reduced from 43 to 34. For rst-time benet claimants the minimum number of weeks did not change but remained at 43, yet the review period over which these weeks could be collected was extended by four months to 28 months for this group. For technical reasons, the group of rst-time claimants was dened as those who had not received UI benets after 1996.
The change in the employment condition was part of the renewal of the Unemployment Compensation Act. This new law was ocially proposed by the government on September 13, 2002, and it came into eect on January 1, 2003. According to the government's law proposal, the main objective of the reform was to simplify legislation by clarifying certain rules and collecting them into a single law. The motivation for relaxing the employment condition mentioned in the law proposal was to encourage the unemployed to take up short-term jobs and to help those with diculties in nding stable jobs to renew their benet eligibility. That is, the 2003 reform was not a response to a change in macroeconomic conditions, which were quite stable at that time yet slightly improving over the later years. The GDP growth rate was around 2% in 20012003 but it roughly doubled for the next few years. The unemployment rate was 9.1% in 2001 and 2002, after which it slowly reduced to 7.7% by 2006.
Other simultaneous changes
In addition to the change in the employment condition, the new law in 2003 involved some other minor changes that aected UI generosity. First, the severance pay system was abolished and replaced by a higher UI benet that could be paid for the rst 150 days of unemployment.
4 Eligibility criteria for the severance pay and higher benet were slightly dierent but they were both targeted at older workers who were laid o for economic reasons after a long working career. Due to rather strict eligibility criteria, a relatively small share of all UI recipients qualied for these payments. In the empirical analysis, we focus on workers who became unemployed after a relatively short job spell, usually at the end of a xed-term contract. As a result, the share of individuals entitled to higher benets based on a long working career is very small in our data (less than 2%). Second, the benet level was increased for the oldest unemployed who receive extended benets after exhausting their regular UI benets. This age group is excluded from our analysis.
Third, the maximum length of a temporary full-time job qualifying for partial benets was reduced from four to two weeks, which may have increased part-time unemployment somewhat. In the empirical analysis we consider workers who received full-time benets after a job loss. Some of them moved from full-time benet into partial benets at a later point (3.1% in our estimation sample), in which case the period of partial benets is treated as a part of the overall unemployment spell. Finally, there was also an earlier reform on March 1, 2002, which increased the benet level of all UI recipients. Since all these other changes aected all UI recipients in the same way, they should not distort our analysis that is based on a dierence-in-dierences setting.
Data

Data sources
Our data was compiled by merging information from various administrative registers.
The register on job seekers, maintained by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, covers all job seekers at the public employment service. One cannot receive unemployment benets without being registered as an unemployed job seeker, which means that all benet recipients should be included in the register. This register contains information on registered job search spells and participation in various active labor market programs, 4 Also this change was meant to simplify the system (as the severance pay and UI benets were paid by dierent institutions) rather than to change benet generosity. Indeed, the size of the benet increase (about 15% on average) was chosen in a such way that the amount of the cumulative benet increase over 150 days roughly equals the abolished severance pay for an average recipient. See Uusitalo and Verho (2010) for an evaluation of the eect of the benet increase.
as well as demographic characteristics of job seekers. However, it does not contain any information on receipt of unemployment benets, nor on regular job spells.
While the UI benets are paid by individual unemployment funds, each fund reports the benets it paid out to the Insurance Supervisory Authority on a quarterly basis.
From the benet register of this authority we obtain information on unemployment fund membership, UI benets received and earnings-related training subsidies. Along with daily benets the records also contain information on the remaining UI entitlement at the end of each quarter. With this information we can keep track of the number of remaining UI days over time. From the Social Security Institution we obtain corresponding information on at-rate unemployment benets and training subsidies.
For all unemployed individuals we merge employment and earnings information from the registers of the Finnish Centre for Pensions, which is a statutory co-operation body of all providers of earnings-related pensions in Finland. It keeps comprehensive records on job spells and earnings for the entire Finnish population, which are used to determine pension benets. We use this information to construct a measure for the number of contribution weeks, to detect exits to employment and to determine the wages and durations of jobs held before and after the unemployment spell.
We dene an unemployment spell as the time the worker collects unemploymentrelated benets. More precisely, we combine sequential spells of benet receipt that are no more than four weeks apart by treating such benet periods as part of the same unemployment spell but ignoring the days without benets between the benet periods.
The time spent in labor market training courses and on partial benets is counted as part of the unemployment spell. The resulting unemployment spell may thus include periods on dierent types of benets. For example, a worker may rst receive UI benets, then the training subsidy for the duration of a training course, and nally end up on labor market subsidy after exhausting his or her UI benets.
The unemployment spell may end with a transition to regular work, a job placement program (i.e. subsidized work) or nonparticipation. The register on job seekers contains information on periods of subsidized employment. It also includes information on exits to regular jobs that applicants found themselves or through the referrals of the employment authorities. However, this information on job ndings is not complete as the exit reason is often missing for those who found a new job on their own. For these reasons, the exits to regular work are detected by comparing the ending dates of the unemployment spells and the starting dates of job spells. Only exits to jobs with a duration of at least four weeks and monthly wage no less than 500 Euros are classied as job ndings.
Sample
We consider unemployment spells that started in 20012004 after a job loss. We require that the duration of the last job was at least four weeks and the job ended within four weeks prior to the benet claim (this eliminates voluntary quits). We further limit our analysis to individuals between the ages of 25 and 54 who have been a member of an unemployment fund for at least two years, who have received UI benets after 1996 and who have been in the labor force for at least 90% of the time during the past two years without being self-employed or hired with a wage subsidy. The age restriction eliminates older workers entitled to extended benets. The UI history condition guarantees that workers with 3442 contribution weeks were aected by the law change. Other restrictions are imposed to improve the accuracy of our measure of the number of the contribution weeks. This variable is dicult to measure because we do not observe working hours and because the review period may be extended for various reasons, and due to the complexity of the rules regarding how self-employment and subsidized employment are treated. Despite these sample restrictions, the estimated number of contribution weeks remains subject to some measurement error, as we illustrate below.
After the change in the employment condition in 2003, workers with 3442 contribution weeks became eligible for a new period of UI benets for 100 weeks. Therefore, we can compare unemployment outcomes within this treatment group over time, using some other group whose eligibility status was not aected by the reform as a comparison group. The most natural candidate for the latter group are workers who are similar to our treatment group members. We consider two such groups: workers with 2033 contribution weeks and those with 4360 weeks. Thus, we limit our econometric analysis to workers with 2060 contribution weeks. Because the law change was proposed on Figure 1 shows the unemployment inow decomposed into the three groups according to the number of contribution weeks. There is a large degree of seasonal variation in the inow and the seasonal pattern varies between the groups. In all groups the inow drops by more than 50% from January to February. The inow rate of individuals with less than 34 contribution weeks increases smoothly from February onward and stabilizes at a high level for the last quarter. For the other two groups, the inow rates are also relatively low from February to May but peak at the start of the summer period and remain at higher levels for the second half of the year. Whereas the inow rate of those with at least 43 contribution weeks roughly doubles in June and July from May, the peak in June is particularly pronounced for those with 3442 contribution weeks (our treatment group), among whom the inow rate more than quadruples from May to June having rst nearly doubled from April to May. It follows that 26% of all spells of the treatment group started in June compared to 8% in the group with less than 34 contribution weeks and 14% in the group with more than 42 contribution weeks.
Apart from the seasonal variation, the inow rates were stable around the time of Instead, the pre-and post-reform distributions are very similar, suggesting that employed workers or their employers did not change their behavior in response to the law change.
In addition to the spike at 43 contribution weeks, there is bunching of observations on the wrong side of the old threshold value. Given that the mass of the observations between 41 and 43 weeks did not vanish in the post-reform period, it is likely to be unrelated to the employment condition. Nor can it be explained by measurement error We have also compared the contribution week distributions separately for workers who were laid o and those whose xed-term contract ended. As a further robustness check, we have examined the distributions of the duration of the previous job for all unemployed workers as well as for the subgroups who became unemployed for dierent reasons. None of these analyses indicates that the timing of the unemployment entry from employment would have changed in response to the 2003 reform. As such, it seems evident that workers do not leave employment for unemployment at a higher rate once their contribution weeks exceed the threshold value of the employment condition. Nor do the employers target dismissals at those employees who would be entitled to the maximum duration of UI benets.
Benet entitlement over time by group
We do not directly observe the contribution weeks in our data but calculate them using information on job spells. Despite the sample restrictions discussed earlier, some inconsistencies in the information obtained from the dierent registers remains. In particular, the number of contribution weeks from the job spell data do not always match the UI records which are supposed to be highly reliable. To illustrate this we depict the fraction of unemployment entrants who qualied for 100 weeks of benets (500 UI days) according to the benet records as a function of contribution weeks computed from the employment records for the spells starting before and after the 2003 reform in gure 4a. In the absence of measurement errors, the share of the unemployed who renewed their entitlement period should be 0% until the threshold of 34 or 43 weeks depending on the entry period, and 100% thereafter. As seen in gure 4a, this is not the case and the degree of classication errors is about 15% for the individuals with 3442 contribution weeks. The key insight from gure 4 is that despite the measurement error in the contribution week variable, the average potential benet duration in the treatment group changed markedly at the time of the reform compared to the other groups. This is the variation we exploit for identication in the econometric analysis.
4.3 Labor market outcomes over time by group 
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The average unemployment duration of workers with 2033 weeks increases over time compared to the group with 4360 weeks. At a glance, this may seem worrisome regarding the parallel trend assumption we need in our analysis, but it may arise from the dierential trends in the potential benet duration between the groups in gure 4d. The 5 To eliminate a few outliers we censor the unemployment spells at 120 weeks (2.2% of observations), the subsequent job spells at 6.5 years (3.5% of the re-employed) and the post-unemployment wages at the 99th percentile by replacing the higher values with these cuto values.
6 When the seasonality-adjusted time series are used, the average unemployment duration is uniformly lowest for the treatment group up until September 2002, after which no systematic dierences between the groups exist. Another measure of successful job search is the probability that the unemployment spell will eventually end with a new job. In gure 5b, we do not see much dierence in the fraction of spells ending in employment between the groups, nor any changes after the reform. In each group, roughly three-quarters of the spells are followed by employment.
About one half of the re-employed returned to their previous employer, even though temporarily laid o workers with a valid employment contract are excluded from the sample. This does not only apply to the workers selected into the analysis, but also to all unemployed, albeit the share of recalls is somewhat smaller in the whole population.
Furthermore, 5% to 7% of exits are to job replacement programs, and roughly 10% to nonparticipation. In the rest of the cases, i.e. for slightly less than 10% of the spells, the exit destination is less clear (e.g. a combination of inactivity and a marginal job that lasted for less than four weeks).
We also consider two measures of match quality: the wage and duration of the rst post-unemployment job for those who found a job with a duration of no less than four weeks. These measures are rather similar for all groups and in all periods in gures 5c and 5d. The new jobs are often relatively long lasting as the average duration is close to one year, but the distribution of job duration is very skewed and, therefore, the median job duration is much less, being 23 weeks. The average match quality of subsequent jobs has To sum up, the pre-reform trends in gure 5 are highly similar for dierent groups, and the changes in the average unemployment duration between the groups over time are consistent with the hypothesis that longer benet periods cause longer spells of unemployment. On the other hand, there is no clear visual evidence implying that the benet duration would aect other outcomes than the unemployment duration. Yet the average changes between the two periods for dierent groups show that the match quality of the subsequent jobs declined slightly less in the treatment group than in the other two groups. There are no notable dierences in the past wage, nor in the level of UI benets between the groups.
Sample means by group and period
Workers with 2033 contribution weeks have been employed for fewer weeks and have been unemployed for more weeks during the past two years than those in the other two groups. However, there are hardly any dierences in employment and unemployment weeks over the past two years between those with 3442 and 4360 contribution weeks, even though the latter group has worked more during the review period of the employment condition by construction. As pointed out previously, the treatment group contains a specic group of workers who enter unemployment in June. These workers experience typically only one short unemployment episode in the summer while being employed for the rest of the year. The existence of this group, which is relatively large and has a lot of employment weeks in the past two years, explains the relatively high employment and relatively low unemployment gures for the treatment group.
Around 90% of workers in all groups have at least some unused UI benets from the previous spell. On average, these benets would be available for 6070 weeks if the employment conditions were not met. This explains why almost all workers also in the control group with 2033 contributions weeks and in the pre-reform treatment group are entitled to UI benets and for a relatively long time on average.
Within the treatment group, the average duration of unemployment is 1.6 weeks longer for spells that started in 20032004 than for spells that started in 20012002 before September 13, 2002 (panel B) . Over the same period the average unemployment duration decreased by 0.6 weeks for those with 2033 contribution weeks and by 2.1 weeks for those with 4360 contribution weeks. The average monthly wage of subsequent jobs is around 2,100 Euros compared to some 2,600 Euros in the previous jobs. However, the average wage decline compared to the previous wage among the re-employed is only about 5%
for those with 2033 contribution weeks and even less for the other two groups. The average re-employment wage dropped by 59 Euros from the pre-to post-reform period in the treatment group and marginally more in the control groups (62 and 69 Euros).
The average duration of subsequent jobs declined by 1.9 weeks after the reform in the treatment group, whereas the corresponding decline is close to four weeks for the two control groups (3.5 and 3.7 weeks). These between-group dierences are consistent with a small positive eect of potential benet duration on the wage and job duration of the next job, even though such evidence is not easily seen in the noisy monthly time series in gure 5. Overall it seems that the unemployed found relatively good jobs compared to their previous jobs, which may not be very surprising given that a large share of them returned to the same employer, possibly to perform the same job.
For comparison purposes we report sample means also for a wider sample by dropping the restriction on the number of contribution weeks in columns 7 and 8. It turns out that our estimation sample is very similar in terms of most background characteristics to all unemployed of the same age group who lost their jobs in the same period, albeit the treatment group includes a relatively high share of health care and social work employees from the public sector. These workers are quite a specic group as they often enter unemployment in June and then return to the same employer after the summer. We keep them in the main analysis but show that dropping them (i.e. the spells started in June)
has no impact on the results.
Econometric analysis
In the previous section, we show that the unemployment inow was stable at the time of the refrom, the distributions of contribution weeks before and after the reform were almost identical, and the changes in the background characteristics over time were small and similar for all groups. All these ndings suggest that the reform did not aect the unemployment inow. By implication, the reform provides a source of exogenous variation for the length of the benet entitlement periods.
A grouping estimator
Consider the model
where Y it is an outcome (e.g. the duration of the unemployment spell) and D it is the length of the entitlement period in weeks at the start of the unemployment spell for a worker i who becomes unemployed at time t. The potential benet duration is a deterministic function of the number of unused benet weeks from the previous unemployment spell R it and the number of contribution weeks H it :
where c t is the threshold value for the employment condition which equals 43 before the 2003 reform, and 34 after that. Since both R it and H it reect past labor market outcomes, they are likely to be correlated with ε it , in which case D it is endogenous in equation (1). If R it and H it were observed without error, we could overcome the endogeneity problem by controlling for their direct eects in the regression of Y it on D it because all the remaining variation in D it would then be driven by the 2003 reform. However, as pointed out previously, we only observe a noisy measure of H it .
Instead we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach based on classifying the individuals into groups that were aected dierently by the 2003 reform. Suppose that the error term can be decomposed as
where g indexes groups. Under this assumption, the causal eect of β can be consistently estimated from the grouped data equation
where Y gt and D gt denote sample means for group g at time t, and the error term u gt is mean-independent of D gt . The common trend assumption in equation (3) states that dierences in average outcomes across groups conditional on the potential benet duration do not change over time. In addition, the potential benet duration must change dierently across groups over time.
It should be stressed that the weighted least squares (WLS) estimator of β using the group sizes as weights can be interpreted as an IV estimator. To see this note that instead of applying WLS to the grouped data we can obtain numerically identical results from individual-level data as follows: rst regress by ordinary least squares (OLS) potential benet durations D it on the group dummies interacted with the time dummies, and then regress the outcomes Y it on the predicted values of D it from the rst stage along with the time and group dummies (see e.g. Blundell et al. 1998 ). Under assumption (3) the group/time interactions have no direct eect on the outcome and thus they can be used as instruments for the potential benet duration.
We still need to choose the groups. One possibility is to use the three broad contribution week groups we used in the descriptive analysis. In doing so, we would ignore heterogeneity in the eect of the reform on potential benet duration arising from different UI histories. As an example, a worker in the treatment group with 90 weeks of unused UI benets from the previous unemployment spell can qualify for 10 extra weeks of benets due to the reform whereas a worker who exhausted his or her benets in the past can qualify for 100 extra weeks. For those aected by the reform the counterfactual benet entitlement equals the number of unused UI weeks from the previous spell, which is observed in our data. By taking into account the counterfactual benet entitlement, we can increase the statistical power of the analysis. Thus, in addition to the contribution weeks, we group the data also according to the number of unused UI days from the previous spell. One category contains workers who exhausted their benets in the past. Those with at least some unused UI days are split into twenty roughly equal-sized categories.
Based on three categories for contribution weeks and 21 categories for unused UI days we obtain 63 distinct groups.
Baseline results
We begin by illustrating the IV grouping estimator graphically. For each of the 63 groups we calculate the average potential benet duration and average outcomes of the unemployment spell before and after the reform. The idea is to compare the changes in the outcomes to the changes in the potential benet duration across groups. Figure 6 plots within-group changes in the outcome variables against the changes in the potential benet durations. For the majority of the groups, including the groups of workers with 3442 contribution weeks who have close to 100 weeks of unused UI benets, the change in the potential benet duration is small. These groups are packed around a change of about ve weeks in the potential benet duration. Despite the small increase in the average benet duration within these groups, the unemployment spells are slightly shorter on average and larger shares of workers found a new job in the post-reform period due to better macroeconomic conditions in the later years. At the same time the average duration and wage of the next job declined pointing to declining match quality.
Changes in the potential benet duration are by far largest for the groups of workers with 3442 contribution weeks who have none or only few unused UI weeks. These are located on the right-hand side of the graphs. Unlike in the other groups, unemployment spells became clearly longer in these groups. The change in the re-employment rate does not dier notably from other groups, but the post-unemployment outcomes may have evolved slightly better than in other groups, albeit the dierences are rather small.
The slope of the WLS regression line in gure 6a suggests that one additional week of UI benets increases the expected duration of unemployment by 0.17 weeks, which corresponds to an elasticity of 0.61.
7 The eect on the re-employment probability is very There is some evidence of positive impacts on the quality of the next job: one extra week of benets is estimated to lead to an increase of 2.9 Euros in the expected monthly wage and to an increase of 0.15 weeks in the expected job duration.
8 Both of these eects are statistically signicant but much smaller than the eect on the expected unemployment duration. The elasticity of the post-unemployment wage is only 0.09 and that of the job duration is 0.19. UI benets for a longer period, the policy makers could reduce the average time spent in unemployment and increase the share of the re-employed while helping the unemployed to nd better jobs in terms of both wage and job duration. Unfortunately these estimates are severely biased. Because workers entitled to longer periods of benets worked more and collected UI benets for fewer weeks in the past, they are generally more employable than others and, therefore, more likely to nd a good job quickly despite their longer benet periods.
In model 2 we add a large array of control variables, including group dummies that control for the eects of (measured) contribution weeks and unused UI weeks from the previous spell. The inclusion of the group dummies mitigates but does not eliminate the endogeneity problem. The results in this case imply that one additional week of UI benets increases the expected unemployment duration by 0.07 week. The results for post-unemployment match quality are somewhat mixed: a longer benet period seems to increase the next wage but reduce the job duration, though the size of the former eect is very small and the latter eect is only marginally signicant. Except for the eect on the 8 When analysing the eects on the post-unemployment outcomes, we use only observations on reemployed workers who could be a selective group. However, this does not seem a signicant problem as the eect on the re-employment probability is typically very close to zero. Notes: Mean is for workers with 3442 contribution weeks in the pre-reform period. Table reports the coecient on the number of the UI weeks the worker is entitled to at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Interactions between group dummies and post-reform dummy are used as instruments in models 3 and 4. All models include year dummies. Models 2, 3 and 4 include group dummies. The set of additional controls include gender, age, education, occupation, the calendar month of unemployment entry, the duration and wage of the previous job, the sector of the previous employer, the reason for termination of the previous job, the fraction of time spent in employment in the past 12 months and 1224 months, and the fraction of time spent on UI benets in the past 12 months and 1224 months.
The standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
job duration, the OLS estimates are similar to the slope estimates in gure 6 but smaller in absolute value.
Our preferred specications are models 3 and 4 where the group/post-reform interactions are used as instruments for the potential benet duration. Apart from including year dummies (and a dierent way of obtaining standard errors), model 3 corresponds to the grouped data regression shown in gure 6 and therefore the results are almost identical.
By comparing the estimates from models 3 and 4 we see that adding a large number of control variables makes little dierence. The eect on the post-unemployment wage drops by one-third but that was very small to start with. The eects on match quality should be interpreted with some caution as the potential selectivity of the re-employed group is ignored. However, if we include also those who did not nd a new job in the analysis and set their wage and job duration to zero, the results remain similar.
A consensus estimate of Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014) 9 One extra 9 Also the denition of the unemployment spell varies across studies: it may refer to the duration of week of benets has been estimated to increase the expected unemployment duration by 0.08 weeks in the U.S. (Card and Levine 2000) , 0.04 to 0.42 weeks in Austria (Lalive et al. 2006; Card et al. 2007; Lalive 2008) , 0.1 to 0.13 weeks in Germany (Schmieder et al. 2012) and 0.18 to 0.58 weeks in Slovenia (van Ours and Vodopivec 2006).
Our estimates imply that longer benet periods may lead to better job matches after unemployment, at least when measured by the expected duration of the next job. This nding is in line with the studies by Centeno and Novo (2009) and Nekoei and Weber (2017) , which nd small positive eects on re-employment wages in Portugal and Austria, respectively. On the other hand, most other studies, such as Lalive (2007) and Card et al. (2007) for Austria, Le Barbanchon (2016) for France, and Schmieder et al. (2016) for Germany, nd negative or no eects of longer benet duration on match quality.
Results for subgroups
In tables 3 and 4 we report IV estimates for various subgroups from the specication without control variables, i.e. the results correspond to model 3 in table 2. The eect of potential benet duration on the expected duration of unemployment is roughly of the same size for both sexes, but only women benet from longer benet periods in terms of better job matches afterward. The eect on the re-employment wage is essentially the same for both sexes but less precisely estimated for men. The longer benet period increases the probability of job nding only for women.
Older workers seem to more responsive to potential benet duration, but they are also more likely to benet from longer search periods in terms of a higher re-employment probability. The eect of potential benet duration on match quality is very similar across the age groups. The eect on unemployment duration does not vary notably by education or by sector of the previous employer. However, only less educated workers and privatesector workers seem to nd better matches due to longer benet periods. In the public sector the wage distribution is more compressed and the wage rate is mainly determined by formal education and work experience in a given occupation. As such, longer search periods are less likely to lead better job oers in the public sector.
One question of interest is how the eect of potential benet duration varies over the business cycle. We cannot address this question directly because our data covers a relative short period of time when the macroeconomic conditions were rather stable. There are however large regional dierences in labor demand conditions. To study the sensitivity of behavioral responses to local labor market conditions, we use register data from the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy on all open vacancies and all unemployed job
seekers at the public employment service and compute average vacancy/unemployed (VU) registered unemployment, the time of UI benet receipt or the time until the next job. 
(8) 
(8) Table reports IV estimates for the eect of the number of the UI weeks the worker is entitled to at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Interactions between group dummies and post-reform dummy are used as instruments. Models do not include control variables, corresponding to the model specication 3 in table 2. The low values refer to the rst quartile, the mid values to the second and third quartiles, and the high values to the fourth quartile. Labor market tightness is measured by average monthly vacancy/unemployment ratio at municipal level over the period 20012004. The UI benet is based on the average monthly wage over the contribution weeks of the employment condition, which can dier from the wage of the previous job.
The standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Column 4 to 6 of table 4 report the estimates for people who dier in the level of the UI benets. In this case, we drop from the sample those who were not entitled to UI benets at the beginning of their unemployment spell (4.6% of all spells). It turns out that UI recipients with the lowest benet levels (the rst quartile) are less responsive to the length of benet period, although they seem to be the only ones who gain from longer benets periods in terms of more stable post-unemployment jobs. Thus, from the point of view of the society, an extension of the benet period would be relatively more costly for workers eligible for higher benets as they would simply collect unemployed for longer without ending up in better jobs later.
The nal set of estimates is for workers who dier in the wage rate of their previous job. The past monthly wage is available also for those who did not qualify for UI benets at the time of unemployment entry, so that no spells are excluded this time. It also diers from the wage rate on which the UI benet is based. The latter is the average wage during the contribution weeks for the employment condition. Thus it may be an average of wages in several jobs, and for those who did not satisfy the employment condition at the start of the current unemployment spell, it is not based on the most recent wage at all but on the wages received before some previous unemployment spell. As seen in columns high UI benets may be somewhat more responsive to changes in the length of the benet period. The eect on quality of next job varies more across groups. Women, low educated and private-sector employees are the most likely to benet in terms of higher wages or more stable jobs from the longer job search periods that longer benet periods enable. Table 5 outcomes by cutting their magnitude by half but hardly aects the impact on the unemployment duration and re-employment probability. Note that excluding these spells leads to a somewhat selective sample as a slightly higher share of the pre-reform spells are excluded because it was easier to qualify for UI benets in the post-reform period.
Robustness checks
In models 5 to 8 we relax the common trend assumption by allowing a distinct linear trend for each of the 63 groups. These estimates are noisier but it is reassuring to nd that the point estimates do not change much from the baseline results. The eect on the unemployment duration decreases marginally whereas the eects on the post-unemployment outcomes remain similar but lose their statistical signicance due to higher standard errors. The only exception is the eect on the re-employment probability which increases to fourfold (model 5 vs. model 1). The point estimate of 0.217 in this case implies an elasticity of 0.19 for the re-employment probability. This estimate is also robust with respect to the sample restrictions (models 6 to 8).
Concluding remarks
We found that one additional week of UI benets increases the expected unemployment duration by some 0.15 weeks, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.5. The estimated eect proved to be fairly similar across dierent worker groups. Our results also imply a positive eect on the re-employment probability. Our baseline estimate is rather small with an implied elasticity of 0.05, but the size of the eect appears to be sensitive with respect to the common trend assumption. Furhermore, our results indicate that one additional week of UI benets increases the expected wage and duration of the next job by some 2 Euros per month and 0.15 weeks respectively. The former eect is very small but the latter eect Table reports IV estimates for the eect of the number of the UI weeks the worker is entitled to at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Interactions between group dummies and post-reform dummy are used as instruments. All models include year and group dummies as well as controls for gender, age, education, occupation, the calendar month of unemployment entry, the duration and wage of the previous job, the sector of the previous employer, the reason for termination of the previous job, the fraction of time spent in employment in the past 12 months and 1224 months, and the fraction of time spent on UI benets in the past 12 months and 1224 months. Models 5 to 8 allow for group-specic linear trends. Models 4 and 8 are estimated without spells started with receipt of labor market subsidy. The standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
is economically signicant. Compared to the evidence from other countries that points to very small (positive or negative) or nonexistent eects on job quality, our ndings are broadly similar yet more positive. The main message for the Finnish government is that the recent reductions of 20% and 40% in the maximum benet duration induce UI recipients to nd new jobs more quickly but those jobs are shorter on average and thereby re-employed workers may also return to unemployment more quickly.
